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Attorney-Client Privilege in the European
Communities after A.M. & S. v.
Commission: The Secret Is Out
By JEFFREY TAYLOR MAKOFF
Member of the Class of 1985
I. INTRODUCTION
InA.. & S. Europe Ltd v. Commission ofthe European Communi-
ties,' the Court of Justice of the European Communities2 (Court of Jus-
tice) considered for the first time the question whether confidential
attorney-client communications were privileged against disclosure
under Community law.3 The Court of Justice held that such a privilege
does exist in Community law, and that it applies in antitrust investiga-
tions4 undertaken by the Commission of the European Communities5
1. 1982 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 1575, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 264.
2. The Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Com-
munities, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 3 & 4, 298 U.N.T.S. 269, 271, established the Court of Justice
of the European Communities [Court of Justice] as the sole judicial institution of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community [ECSCJ, the European Atomic Energy Community
[EURATOM], and the European Economic Community [EEC]. Present members of the
European Communities are Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Republic of Ireland, and the United Kingdom
[hereinafter referred to as Member States]. See generally J. USHER, EUROPEAN COURT
PRACTICE 3-7 (1983); Barav, The Judicial Power of the European Economic Community, 53 S.
CAL. L. REv. 461, 461-525 (1980); Stuart, The Court of Justice of the European Communities
The Scope of Its Jurisdiction and the Evolution of Its Care Law under the EEC Treaty, 3 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 415, 415-27 (1981).
3. The general principles of Community law are discussed in Verstrynge, TheRelation.
shi Between National and Community Antitrust Law: An Overview After the Perflume Casefr,
3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 358, 3 69-72 (1981) and Warner, The Relationshp Between European
Community Law and the National Laws of Afember States, 93 LAw Q. REv. 349, 349-66
(1977). A significant aspect of Community law is that it acts in derogation of any conflicting
national law of a Member State. Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartdlmant, 1969 E.
Comm. CL J. Rep. 1, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 100; Amministrazione delle Finanze dello
Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A, 1978 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 629, [1978] Comm. MkL LR. 263.
4. The privilege should apply, a fortiori, to proceedings within the Court of Justice
itself. See J. USHER, supra note 2, at 216.
5. The Commission of the European Communities [Commission] was created by the
Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communi-
ties, doneApr. 8, 1965, entered intoforce July 1, 1967, art. 9, 10 J.0. CotM. EUR. 152 (1967)
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(Commission). The Court of Justice, however, recognized only a lim-
ited right of corporate clients to refuse to disclose their confidential
communications with counsel. Specifically, only communications be-
tween an independent attorney and a client, for "purposes of the cli-
ent's defense" were recognized as falling within the privilege. 6
United States federal and state courts, and the Federal Trade
Commission,7 in contrast, recognize a comparatively broad attorney-
client privilege' of nondisclosure in communication on legal matters
between attorneys and their corporate clients.9 This privilege exists
even when the attorney and client share an employment relationship,
as in the case of in-house counsel,' 0 and when the communication is
not made in anticipation of litigation." In fact, United States courts
reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
TREATIES B8030, B8033 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Merger Treaty], to assume jurisdiction
over a broad scope of executive and legislative functions of the ESCS, EURATOM, and the
EEC. See also Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
arts. 124 & 155, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 63, 71 (entered in force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as
EEC Treaty].
6. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611-12, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323-
24.
7. The usual laws of privilege apply in Federal Trade Commission [FTC] investigative
hearings, document discovery and adjudicative proceedings. See 16 C.F.R. § 3,3 1(b)(2),
§ 2.8A(a), § 2.9(b)(2) & § 2.11(b) (1984).
8. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554-57 (McNaughton rev. 1961),
for a general statement of the United States attorney-client privilege. See also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (Final Draft 1982).
9. United States courts frequently describe the attorney-client privilege as "narrow" or
"strictly construed." See, e.g., Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602
(8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1965). See also 8 J. WIOMORE,
supra note 8, § 2291, at 545-54. The United States privilege, even narrowly construed, how-
ever, protects a far broader range of communications between attorney and client than does
the Community privilege. For example, in-house corporate counsel may claim the United
States privilege. See infra note 10. The same is true in England. See Alfred Crompton
Amusement Machinery Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise (No. 2), [1972] 2 Q.B.
102, [1972] 2 All E.R. 353, 376-77.
10. Existence of the United States attorney-client privilege is not determined by the
relationship of the attorney to the corporation per se, but by the relationship between the
attorney and the particular agents of the corporation for whom the privilege is claimed, the
substance of the communication, waiver of the privilege and the existence of a specific ex-
ception preventing its application. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United
States v. International Business Machine Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439
U.S. 955 (1978). See also McKenney, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product I1tn-
munity: An In-Depth Analysis of the Doctrines and Their Application to Corporate 4]airrs, 88
COM. L.J. 10, 10-27 (1983). United States attorneys employed by entities managed by non-
attorneys do have an ethical obligation to maintain professional independence. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (Final Draft 1982).
11. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 2294, at 558-65. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) in
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have largely assumed that the attorney-client privilege applies fully to
corporate clients,1 2 without any detailed legislative or judicial treat-
ment of the subject. 3 Attorneys practicing in the United States rely
upon the attorney-client privilege in structuring their conduct toward
clients.' 4 United States attorneys and clients who are subject to Euro-
pean Community jurisdiction"5 should be aware that professional con-
fidentiality is treated quite differently under Community law.
This Note examines the evolving principle of attorney-client privi-
lege in Community law. The discussion will focus initially upon the
Court of Justice's decision in theA.M. & S. case. Next, this Note con-
siders several issues in the Community law of attorney-client privilege
that were left unresolved by A.M & S. This Note concludes with a
summary of the Community law of attorney-client privilege. Although
not a comparative study, this Note provides reference to United States
law when a comparative treatment is elucidating.
II. THE A.M. & S. DOCTRINE
A. Facts of the Case
A.M. & S. arose during the Commission's investigation of several
companies in the zinc industry that were suspected of price-fixing, tam-
pering with supply and dividing markets in violation of Community
antitrust laws. 6 In February 1979 Commission agents searched the
Bristol, England premises of A.M. & S. During the two-day search
Commission agents seized approximately thirty-five documents and left
the company's managing director with a written request specifying ad-
ditional papers to be provided to the Commission. Pursuant to that
request, the managing director surrendered seven files of documents,
but refused to produce several other documents on the ground that they
were protected under the doctrine of professional privilege recognized
in England. 7 A.M. & S. described to the Commission the retained
which the qualified immunity accorded to attorney "work product" exists only for materials
obtained by an attorney "in anticipation of litigation or for trial." See alro Diversified In-
dustries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977).
12. Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 37 Bus. LAw. 461, 475-76 (1982).
13. Id.
14. See eg., id. at 513.
15. See generally Barav, supra note 2.
16. Such practices are prohibited by the EEC Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 85 & 86, 298
U.N.T.S. at 47-49, which are the EEC's substantive antitrust laws.
17. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1579, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 267.
Attorney-client privilege is discussed at length in Waugh v. British Ry. Bd., [1979] A.C. 521,
[1979] 2 All E.R. 1169.
19841
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documents' contents, and offered to reveal portions of the documents,
in an apparent attempt to establish a factual basis for the privilege
claim.1 8
In July 1979 the Commission ordered A.M. & S. to produce, inter
alia, all documents for which the privilege was claimed.' 9 In a formal
decision, the Commission categorically denied the existence of an attor-
ney-client privilege in Community law, but indicated that it would re-
spect the confidentiality of written legal communications used in the
defense of a firm being investigated when the laws of the Member State
in which the search was conducted recognized such a privilege.20 The
Commission further stated that the existence of a privilege would be
determined in each case by the Commission itself, following an exami-
nation of the allegedly privileged documents by a Commission agent.2'
Despite the Commission's decision, A.M. & S. again refused to
relinquish possession of the contested documents. The Commission re-
fused to base a determination of the existence of a privilege upon a
partial viewing of the documents. In October 1979 A.M. & S. com-
menced an action in the Court of Justice challenging the Commission's
order,22 further defiance of which might have subjected A.M. & S. to
penalties for obstructing the Commission's investigation of A.M. & S.'s
trade practices.23
B. Decision of the Court of Justice
In a decision rendered in May 1982, the Court of Justice analyzed
theA.M. & S. case in terms of three major issues: (1) whether Commu-
nity law recognized an attorney-client privilege and, if so, what stan-
dards &ove med its application; (2) what procedures should be followed
to determine the existence of a privilege in each case, viz. who should
rule on its applicability; and (3) which of the documents that A.M. & S.
refused to yield were covered by the privilege.
18. See.A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1626, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 279
(Opinion of Advocate General).
19. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 31, 32 (1979).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 32-33.
22. The EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76, empowers private
parties to bring "direct actions" before the Court of Justice to challenge "the legality of acts
of the Council and the Commission other than recommendations or opinions."
23. See Council Regulation No. 17 of Feb. 6, 1962, 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. (1962) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Regulation 17]. Penalties for noncompliance with Regulation 17 may be in the
form of fines or coercive "periodic payments." Id. arts. 15(1)(c) & 16(1)(d).
24. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1605-18, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 318-
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1. The Community Principle of "Legal Confidentiality"
After finding that the Commission possessed a general power to
seize written communications between attorneys and corporate clients
which are relevant to antitrust investiations,25 the Court of Justice de-
cided that the Commission's investigatory powers were limited by a
"principle of legal confidentiality."26 The Court of Justice recognized,
as a point of fact, that all of the Member States had, in some form, a
policy that "any person must be able, without constraint, to consult a
lawyer."'27 The court noted, however, that the Member States' domes-
tic laws varied widely in scope and in the criteria for applying an attor-
ney-client privilege in domestic proceedings.28 Furthermore the
Member States also differed in the policies recognized in their domestic
law as supporting the privilege.29
After comparing the Member States' national laws, the Court of
Justice concluded:
[Tihere are to be found in the national laws of the Member States
common criteria inasmuch as those laws protect, in similar circum-
stances, the confidentiality of written communications between law-
yer and client provided that, on the one hand, such communications
are made for the purpose and in the interests of the client's rights of
defence and, on the other hand, they emanate from independent law-
yers, that is to say, lawyers who are not bound to the client by a
relationship of employment.30
By employing what has been described as a "common denomina-
tor" analysis31 the Court of Justice held that the Community law of
attorney-client privilege encompassed the common elements of the
Member States' domestic laws of attorney-client privilege, as described
25. In id. at 1609-10, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 322, the Court of Justice held that
Regulation 17, supra note 23, art. 14, "empowers the Commission to require production...
[of] documents concerning the market activities of the undertaking.... [Wjritten commu-
nications between lawyer and client fall, in so far as they have a bearing on such activities,
within [this] category of documents."
26. Regulation 17, supra note 23, art. 20, expressly prohibits the Commission from dis-
closing secrets obtained in its investigations. This differs from the question addressed in
A.M. & S. as to an entity's right to refuse to disclose confidential communications to the
Commission.
27. A.M & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1610, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
28. Id., [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
29. Id. at 1610-11, [19821 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
30. Id. at 1611, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
31. Forrester, Legal Professional Privileg Limitations on the Commission's Powrs of
Inspection Following theA M & S Judgment, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 75, 82 (1983). See
infra text accompanying notes 112-23.
1984]
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in the above-quoted passage. 32 Thus, A.M. & S. established that writ-
ten communications made between a client and an independent attor-
ney which are prepared "for the purposes and in the interests of the
client's rights of defence" need not be disclosed to Commission agents
in an antitrust investigation.33 The Court of Justice held that the privi-
lege applies to all written communications made after legal proceedings
are initiated, and to earlier communications which relate to the subject
matter of the proceedings. 34 Furthermore, the court ruled that the priv-
ilege is held by the client and may be waived at the client's discretion.3 1
2. Policies Advanced
The Court of Justice advanced two grounds for the rule adopted in
A.M. & S. First, the court held that attorney-client privilege is, to an
extent, a defendant's right, which should be recognized in Community
law.36 Second, the court recognized that the Community rule of attor-
ney-client privilege should include factors that would discourage its
abuse.37
In its briefs, A.M. & S. argued that attorney-client privilege was a
fundamental human right.3 I Advocate General Jean-Pierre Warner,3 9
and presumably the Court of Justice, rejected this claim, however, on
the ground that neither the European Convention for the Protection of
32. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
33. Id., [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
34. Id., [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
35. Id. at 1612-13, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 324-25. Here the Court of Justice
deviates slightly from the "common denominator" analysis as in France a lawyer may uni-
laterally prevent disclosure of confidential communications with a client. See P. HERZoO,
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 77 (1967).
36. A.A. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323-24.
37. Id. at 1612, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 324.
38. Id. at 1636, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 290-91 (Opinion of Advocate General),
Older United States cases allude to the right of the client "freely and fully [to] confer and
confide" in a lawyer. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960); Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956). Recent United States cases stress the public
ends served by the privilege, particularly that of fostering compliance with the law by the
unimpeded exchange of legal information between counsel and client. See Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 384
(D.D.C. 1978); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), ceri. denied 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
39. The Court of Justice staff includes five Advocates General who assist the court by
delivering "impartial and independent" opinions on the issues in each case. EEC Treaty,
supra note 5, art. 166, 298 U.N.T.S. at 74. Since the court often adopts the reasoning of the
Advocates General it is useful to study their opinions, which are published with the court's
consensus opinions. See Toepke, The European Economic Communily-A Profile, 3 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 640, 651 (1981).
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,40 nor the constitution of
any Member State recognizes a fundamental right of confidentiality be-
tween attorney and client.41 The Court of Justice did, however, find
that the regulations vesting the Commission with broad powers of
search and seizure were designed to ensure that the rights of the de-
fense were adequately protected.42 The court stated that attorney-client
privilege was an essential corollary to those rights43 but that the scope
of the privilege is limited in the interest of furthering other policies,
such as ensuring the Commission's access to facts regarding unlawful
trade practices.44
The Court of Justice thus indicated that only communications re-
lated to specific duties in connection with a client's defense are pro-
tected.45 It should be noted, however, that the court declared that
communications will be privileged even if they are made before an in-
vestigation is commenced.4 6 This is borne out by the fact that the doc-
uments held to be protected inA.M. & S. were drafted some six years
before the Commission searched the company's premises. 47
The second major consideration behind the court's formulation of
the Community attorney-client privilege was the court's desire to use
the privilege to further, rather than to obstruct, the administration of
justice. The court stated that the attorney's role was to collaborate with
the courts in administering justice.48 Attorneys who are bound to their
clients by a relationship of employment, the court reasoned, cannot
pursue justice with requisite independence. 49 Furthermore, the Court
of Justice noted that in-house counsel are not accorded full profes-
sional status in some Member States,50 and are not, in those States,
40. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doas, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
41. See A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. at 1636, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
290-91 (Opinion of Advocate General).
42. Id. at 1611, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 290-91.
43. Id., [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 290-91.
44. Id. at 1609, 1612, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 322, 324. See afto 1982 E. Comm.
Ct. 1. Rep. at 1655-56, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 310 (Opinion of Advocate General).
45. Id. at 1614, [198212 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 326. Cf. Forrester, supra note 31, at 82.
46. Id. at 1611, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
47. Id. at 1614, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 326.
48. Id. at 1611-12, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 324.
49. Id., [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 324.
50. See id. at 1655, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 309-10 (Opinion of Advocate Gen-
eral). In Germany, for instance, in-house lawyers cannot represent their employers in court
or before arbitration tribunals. Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung § 46, 1959, Bundesgesetzblatt
[BGB1] 1565 (W. Ger.) Because of this fact, Community law defers to national policy on the
issue of "salaried" lawyers' competency to represent their employers in legal proceedings.
1984]
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subject to rules of professional ethics. 1 The court seems to have rea-
soned that attorneys who are not subject to professional discipline have
no disincentive to abuse an attorney-client privilege, and therefore
should not be granted its protection. Hence emerged the rule that the
Community attorney-client privilege applies only to independent coun-
sel, ie., attorneys consulted for a fee but not employed by their
clients.52
3. Procedural Issues
After finding that an attorney-client privilege does exist in Com-
munity law, the Court of Justice faced the issue of who would deter-
mine if and when the privilege applied. 3 The court rejected the
Commission's contention that the Commission itself should determine
when the confidentiality principle applied. The court also refused to
accept that such issues should be brought before the Member State's
domestic courts.54 The court held:
Since this is a matter involving an appraisal and a decision which
affect the conditions under which the Commission may act in a field
as vital to the functioning of the common market as that of compli-
ance with the rules on competition, the solution of disputes as to the
application of the protection of the confidentiality of written commu-
nications between lawyer and client may be sought only at Commu-
nity level.55
The court went on to rule that an entity against which discovery of
attorney-client communications is sought must, in the first instance,
provide Commission agents with relevant material to demonstrate that
the communications are privileged.56 At that point the entity is not
Council Directive 77/249 of Mar. 22, 1977 on Freedom of Lawyers to Provide Services, art.
6, 20 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. L 78) 17, 18 (1977).
51. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1655, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 309-10
(Opinion of Advocate General).
52. See infra note 93 for the text of an American Bar Association resolution asking the
Council of Ministers to "study" and "extend" the privilege to in-house counsel.
53. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1606-08, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 318-
21 (Judgment).
54. This could also be a substantive issue. For instance, the British Government, inter-
venor in A.M. & S., argued that the law of professional privilege of the Member State in
which documents are found should apply. Id. at 1640, (1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 295
(Opinion of Advocate General). Advocate General Warner supported using national courts
as fora for applying Community law in legal privilege cases. Id.
55, Id. at 1613, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 325.
56. Id., [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 325. See also Commission Decision 82/756, 25
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 319) 12, 14 (1982), where the Commission, in its only published
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required to reveal the contents of the communications in question.57 If
the Commission is not satisfied that the privilege applies, and if the
entity refuses to supply additional probative material, the entity may
petition the Court of Justice for relief from any penalty imposed by the
Commission for the entity's failure to cooperate with the investiga-
tion.58 Once lodged in the Court of Justice, privilege claims would usu-
ally be heard by a Chamber composed of three judges.59 While the
Chambers may, at any stage, refer cases to the Court of Justice en
banc,6° decisions of the three-judge panels are not appealable.61
4. The A.M. & S. Documents
The contested documents inA.M. & S. included: (1) requests from
company agents to private lawyers for legal advice; (2) communications
from private attorneys to company agents containing legal advice; and
(3) documents created by, and circulated among, company executives
summarizing legal advice received from private attorneys.62 These
communications took the form of letters, telexes, and memoranda.
Though it is not expressly stated in the A.M. & S. opinion, the court
apparently held that documents in group (3), the summaries by execu-
tives, were not protected as they originated outside of the attorney-cli-
ent relationship.63 Since the documents in groups (1) and (2) were
application of the A.M. & S. standard, stated that the Commission, not the investigated
entity, would determine what material is relevant.
57. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. C. J. Rep. at 1613, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. LR. at 325.
See infra text accompanying notes 99-111.
58. Id. See also Regulation 17, supra note 23, art. 17, and EEC Treaty, supra note 5,
arts. 172 & 173,298 U.N.T.S. at 75-76. Commencing an appeal of a Commission decision in
the Court of Justice does not automatically stay the effect of a penalty imposed by the deci-
sion. Id., art. 185, 298 U.N.T.S. at 78. A claimant may petition the Court of Justice, how-
ever, for an interim order suspending operation of the penalty pending judicial review of the
conflicL See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (con-
solidated version), art. 83, 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 39) 1, 20 (1982) [hereinafler cited as
Rules of Procedure].
59. EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 165, 298 U.N.T.S. at 73-74; Protocol on the Statute of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Apr. 17, 1957, art. 15, 298 U.N.T.S. 147,
150 [hereinafter cited as Statute of the Court]; Rules of Procedure, supra note 58, arts. 9,26,
46 & 95(1).
60. Rules of Procedure, supra note 58, art. 95(1) § 4. See, eg., Mills v. European In-
vestment Bank, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 955, 967. See also J. USHERJ., .nlra note 2, at 172-
76. A.M. & S. was decided by the court en banc, presumably because the case was one of
first impression.
61. The EEC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 165, 298 U.N.T.S. at 73-74, expressly gives the
Court of Justice's Chambers the power to "adjudicate" certain cases.
62. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1643-44, [198212 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 298-
99 (Opinion of Advocate General).
63. C. KERsE, EEC ANTrrRusT PROCEDURE 29, § 8.13-8.17 (Supp. 1982).
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prepared by private attorneys, the requirement of "independent" coun-
sel was met and the sole remaining issue in determining whether the
privilege applied to those documents was whether the documents were
prepared for purposes of A.M. & S.'s defense.
The Court of Justice found the documents in groups (1) and (2) to
contain primarily legal advice and opinions of counsel on A.M. & S.'s
potential antitrust liability under Community law after the United
Kingdom's accession to the Community in 1973.64 In so finding the
court held these written communications between A.M. & S. and its
private attorneys to be protected against disclosure to Commission
agents.6 5 The court did not consider any evidence of the Commission's
investigatory need for the documents,6 6 thus suggesting that the privi-
lege, once found, is absolute, and that privileged documents are beyond
the Commission's investigatory reach.6 7
III. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The A.M. & S. decision left unanswered several questions regard-
ing the Community's attorney-client privilege. Among the outstanding
questions are the following: (1) whether attorneys who are not admit-
ted to the bar of a Member State are protected by the privilege; (2) by
what conduct, and by whom, may the privilege be waived; (3) whether
in camera inspection of all contested documents will be required; and
(4) what are the implications of A.M. & S. with respect to the rules of
decision applied by the Court of Justice in areas of Community law
which, like the attorney-client privilege issue, are not addressed by
Community treaties or legislation.6
A. Non-Community Lawyers May Not Be Protected
A.M. & S. established that attorneys must not be bound to their
clients by a relationship of employment if their clients hope to rely
upon the Community attorney-client privilege; the attorney must be in-
64. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1614, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 326.
65. Id. at 1614-15, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 326.
66. Id. at 1614, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 326.
67. This contrasts with the qualified immunity from search and seizure granted to
"agents, advisers and lawyers" appearing before the Court of Justice. The court may "waive
[that] immunity where it considers that the proper conduct of proceedings will not be hin-
dered thereby." Rules of Procedure, supra note 58, arts. 32-34.
68. Query also how national courts of Member States will regard information which is
required to be disclosed under Community law, but which would be protected under na-
tional law.
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dependent for the privilege to apply.69 Hence, in-house counsel are
never protected, regardless of the legal or nonlegal nature of communi-
cations with their corporate employers.7" The A.M. & S. court indi-
cated in dicta that yet a further qualification may exist barring some
independent attorneys from claiming the privilege. 71 The Court of Jus-
tice stated that the attorney-client privilege applies to attorneys who are
"entitled to practise [their] profession in one of the Member States." '
The issue suggested here is whether communications with non-Com-
munity attorneys are ever privileged against examination and seizure
by the Commission. C. Kerse,73 a British legal commentator, suggests
that communications with attorneys who are not qualified to practice
before a Member State's domestic courts will not be privileged in Com-
mission proceedings underA.M. & S.74
Kerse compared the English and French texts of the A.M. & S.
opinion and noted a disparity in word choice (or translation) that
would make the difference as to whether clients of non-Community
attorneys, including United States attorneys, may claim the privilege.
The English text states that the privilege applies "without distinction to
any lawyer entitled to practice his profession in" a Member State."5
This suggests that non-Community attorneys who are entitled to prac-
tice within Community territory would be protected. The French text,
however, reads "avocat inscrit au barreau,76 which was translated in
the Protocol to the Statute of the Court of Justice77 to mean an attorney
entitled to practice before a court of a Member State,78 a qualification
that would not be met by attorneys admitted to the bar only in non-
Community jurisdictions.7 9 If the French text accurately states the rule
in A.M. & S., then communications from United States attorneys to
their clients in Europe are not protected from disclosure to the
69. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
70. Compare the United States law, supra note 10.
71. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1612, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 324.
72. Id., [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 324.
73. C. Kerse, LL.B., Solicitor, author of EEC ANTrrRUST PROCEDURE (1980).
74. C. KERSE, supra note 63 at § 8.17.
75. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. at 1612, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 324.
76. The French text reads: "'La protection ainsi accord4e. . . dolt s'appliquer indirtincte-
ment t tots les avocats inscrits au barreau de Iun des 1tats nembres, quel que soit PAttat
membre ojt rside le client." A.M. & S. Europe Ltd. v. Commission des Communaut6s
europtennes, 1982 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 1575, 1612.
77. Statute of the Court, supra note 58, art. 17.
78. C. KERSE, supra note 63 (emphasis added).
79. Id.
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Commission.
One reason for regarding the English text as stating the correct
rule is that English was the language of the case in A.M. & S. Under
the court's rules of procedure,81 each case is designated to be conducted
in one of eight languages.82 All written and oral argument, supporting
documents and the minutes and decisions of the court are presented in
the designated language.83 The court's decisions are later published in
seven languages, six in translation.8 4 Since theA.M. & S. court dealt in
English with that case, the English phraseology may most accurately
reflect the court's intended result. The fact that French has served as
the court's internal "working language," 85 however, weakens the sug-
gestion that the English text should be followed. The judges of the
court may be more sensitive to the French meaning of terms than they
are to the English meaning, particularly in using phrases that have ap-
peared in other Community texts. Community law has no clear rule as
to which translation controls in an apparent conflict of interpretations,
such as the one which appears to exist between the English and French
texts of A.M. & S. Only the Court of Justice itself has the power to
definitively resolve the conflicting interpretations of 4.M . & S. 86
Approached differently, the absence of express language inA.M. &
S. excluding non-Community counsel and the lack of discussion of the
policies supporting exclusion indicates that the court may not have ac-
tually considered the issue. An American Bar Association [ABA]
study87 concluded that in stating that the privilege must apply "without
80. Cf. UNIF. R. EVID. § 502(a)(3) (1974) which states: "A 'lawyer' is a person author-
ized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to engage in the practice of law in
any state or nation." (emphasis added); See also CAL. EvID. CODE § 950 (West 1984). The
Court of Justice stated in E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. C.B.S. United Kingdom Ltd., 1976 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 811,827, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 235, that application of the Commu-
nity antitrust laws is not conditioned upon notions of "reciprocity" vis-A-vis states outside of
the Community. The court might thus be unreceptive to an argument that the liberal treat-
ment accorded foreign lawyers under United States law should affect the court's decision on
whether the Community legal privilege applies to United States lawyers.
81. Rules of Procedure, supra note 58, art. 29(l)(2), §§ 1-5.
82. Id., art. 29(l)(2), §§ I & 2. The eight languages are Danish, Dutch, English, French,
German, Greek, Irish and Italian. Id.
83. Id. § 3.
84. Id. art. 30, § 2. See also I J.O. COMM. EUR. 385 (1958).
85. L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
15 (1977).
86. Under the Statute of the Court, supra note 58, art. 40, any party or Community
institution may petition to have the Court of Justice construe the meaning or scope of a
previous decision.
87. Report to the House of Delegates, 1982 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. & PRAC. REP. No. 301.
[hereinafter cited as A.B.A. REPORT No. 301].
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distinction to any lawyer entitled to practice his profession in one of the
member-States [sic]," the court may only have meant that A.M. & S.
would apply without discrimination to attorneys of the Member States,
without excluding otherwise qualified non-Community attorneys.8
Another interpretation of the "entitled to practice" language would be
that it states a rule that only communication with duly admitted mem-
bers of a national bar will give rise to the privilege.
Fortunately, theA.M. & S. opinion does not foreclose the possibil-
ity that the attorney-client privilege covers independent members of
any bar. The disputed language ofA.M. & S. would permit the Court
of Justice, with little embarassment, to assure that the attorney-client
privilege extends to communications with non-Community attorneys.
The court could simply hold in a future case that the English text accu-
rately stated the rule inA.M. & S.
The Court of Justice should conclude that communications with
United States attorneys are protected by the Community's attorney-cli-
ent privilege. Like their Community counterparts, United States attor-
neys are bound by a code of professional ethics8 9 which applies to
United States attorneys practicing abroad.90 While attorneys who are
unable to practice before Member States' courts may be less likely to
communicate "for purposes of a client's defense" with regard to specific
litigation, it cannot be presumed that United States attorneys are not
involved in the kind of pre-litigation or preventive counseling that the
British solicitors conducted for A.M. & S.9' In view of the limited na-
ture of the privilege recognized in A.M. & S., the Court of Justice
would strain to find a cognizable cost to the Community from also pro-
tecting clients of United States attorneys.
The Court of Justice's extending the attorney-client privilege to
cover United States attorneys would be a logical recognition of the in-
terdependence of United States and European business and legal com-
munities.92 At best, the policy of A.M. & S., as interpreted to deny
protection to communications with United States attorneys, creates un-
necessary administrative inefficiencies for the clients and attorneys in-
volved. Attorneys attempting to protect their advice to clients may feel
88. Id. at 5.
89. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Final Draft 1982).
90. Id. Rule 8.5.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
92. For a compilation of United States government data on U.S.-European interdepen-
dence, see A.B.A. REPORT No. 301, mpra note 87, at 18.
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compelled to funnel all written client communications through local
Community counsel.
At worst, such a rule increases the likelihood that the minimal pri-
vacy protection offered to clients underA.M. & S. will not be available
to a client, solely because the client communicated with non-Commu-
nity counsel. This result would foil the court's stated policy objective
of protecting investigated parties' defense rights by depriving clients of
a choice of counsel and by withholding protection as to documents
which were drafted by non-Community lawyers prior to the A.M. & S.
decision. Until the court resolves the differing interpretations of A.M
& S., or until the Council addresses the issue, however, non-Commu-
nity attorneys should probably consider their confidential written com-
munications with clients to be unprotected under an ambiguous
Community standard.
In February 1983 the ABA House of Delegates adopted a resolu-
tion requesting the Commission of the European Communities to give
force to the attorney-client privilege whether it is asserted by a client of
Community or non-Community counsel, and to study the possibility of
extending the privilege to in-house counsel.93 Even if the Commission
agrees to recognize the privilege as applicable to non-Community at-
torneys, this recognition would only be a self-imposed administrative
policy, which could be withdrawn or changed at any time by the Com-
mission. Nothing less than Council legislation, or a definitive word
from the Court of Justice will assure long-term protection for clients of
non-Community attorneys. Nonetheless, the United States State De-
partment's Mission to the European Communities reportedly supports
the ABA recommendations, and there are even indications that the
Commission will propose to the Council that non-Community attor-
93. The ABA House of Delegates adopted the following resolution at its 1983 midyear
meeting:
Be It Resolved, That the American Bar Association requests the Commission
of the European Communities, when conducting a competition inquiry pursuant to
Article 11 or 14 of Regulation 17, to grant to an undertaking the same protection,
including the same procedural safeguards, against disclosure of written communi-
cations with a U.S. lawyer that Community law accords to a client's written com-
munications with a lawyer of a Member State of the European Community.
Be It Resolved, That, as a separate matter from the above resolution, the
American Bar Association requests the Commission of the European Communities
to study and extend the attorney-client privilege to house counsel, whether of
Member States of the Communities, or otherwise.
SUMMARY OF AcTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1983) at 20.
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neys be covered explicitly by the attorney-client privilege.94
B. Waiver of Protection
InA.M. & S. the Court of Justice held that the Community attor-
ney-client privilege did not bar clients from disclosing communications
with their attorneys.9 5 Thus, in the language of United States courts,
the privilege is held by the client, Ze., the client may waive the protec-
tion, whether or not the attorney agrees. In the context of Community
law this means that an entity may voluntarily surrender attorney-client
communications to Commission investigators when the entity believes
it advantageous to do so.96 While an unqualified, voluntary surrender
of the documents would certainly constitute such a waiver, a question is
raised as to whether more equivocal conduct of the client will also be
interpreted as a permanent waiver of the client's right to assert that
documents are protected from disclosure on the ground of attorney-
client privilege.
Unfortunately, Community law has not yet developed a discerni-
ble waiver doctrine, and the A.M. & S. case sheds no light on how the
Court of Justice would resolve waiver questions. Since the court seems
inclined to interpret attorney-client privilege issues with reference to
the common legal traditions of the Member States,97 a comparative ex-
amination of these traditions may be useful in ascertaining the Com-
munity law on specific waiver issues. Given the dissimilarity between
the attorney-client privilege in the United States and in Community
law, it would be unsafe for United States attorneys to presume that
principles of waiver recognized in the United States will apply, or even
be considered by the Court of Justice, in determining Community
law.98
C. In Camera Inspection of Contested Documents
The H.M & S. opinion does not state whether contested docu-
ments lodged with the Court of Justice would necessarily be subject to
in camera inspection by the judges. Nor does it state whether a claim-
94. See Report on International Trade Developments 8 (Nov. 1983) (Publihed b,
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Washington, D.C.).
95. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1613, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.L at 324-25.
96. Id.
97. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
98. The author's LEXIS search of 1830 Court of Justice cases indicated that the court
has cited United States law as authority in only 41 cases. (The search was undertaken on
Jan. 20, 1984, and encompassed a cross-search of the key words "United States," "U.S.,"
and "American" with "law," "courts" and "rnle')
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ant would be allowed to make a prima facie showing of privilege using
evidence outside the documents themselves and voluntarily disclosed
portions of the documents. 99 The Court of Justice's jurisdiction to or-
der in camera inspection of documents is clear under the court's en-
abling statute"°° which states that "[t]he Court [of Justice] may require
the parties to produce all documents and to supply all information
which the Court considers desirable."10'
Advocate General Jean-Pierre Warner stated in A.M. & S. that
"the only satisfactory way of deciding whether a document is entitled
to protection is by allowing someone to look at it."' 0 2 Although the
experience of the United States courts 0 3 challenges the accuracy of
Warner's view, the treatment of the contested documents inA.M. & S,
suggests that the Court of Justice may accept Warner's view. InA.M. &
S. the company deposited the contested documents, sealed, with the
Court of Justice before the court adjudicated the merits of the com-
pany's claim."° The court ruled upon the privilege's applicability to
the A.M. & S. documents with reference to their actual contents. 10 5
A commentator suggests that the Court of Justice lacks the admin-
istrative capacity to deal effectively with a deluge of applications to
resolve disputes arising on the issue of attorney-client privilege. 10 6 The
bulk of this increased workload would fall upon the court's Chambers,
which will decide most professional privilege cases, 10 7 and particularly
upon the Advocates General, who must deliver an opinion in every
99. United States federal courts sometimes order in camera inspection of contested doc-
uments. See e.g., Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 382, 384 (N.D. I11.
1970); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 864 (8th Cir. 1956); U.S. v. Tratner, 511
F.2d 248, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1975). See also Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). But see F.T.C. v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir,
1980). Administrative Law Judges in FTC proceedings may require in camera inspection of
documents only in "unusual and exceptional circumstances." See 16 C.F.R. § 3.45 (1983).
Compare the view of some state courts, infra at note 111.
100. Statute of the Court, supra note 59, art. 21, 298 U.N.T.S. at 152. Unlike the Com-
mission under Regulation 17, the Court of Justice cannot impose monetary sanctions for a
party's failure to produce requested documents. The court may, however, take "formal no-
tice" of the failure, and may base an adverse finding upon a lack of requested evidence. Id,
See also USHER, supra note 1, at 193.
101. Statute of the Court, supra note 58, art. 21.
102. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1637, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 291.
103. See infra note 109.
104. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1603-04, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 270.
105. Id., [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 270.
106. See Fox, Professional Privilege in EEC Law, 127 SOLIC. J. 233, 236 (1983).
107. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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case before the court, including cases in Chambers.108 Requiring in
camera inspection of each contested document would increase this bur-
den, especially in antitrust litigation, where investigations may involve
many documents.
The Court of Justice could prevent this anticipated problem by
allowing parties claiming the legal privilege to show circumstantially
the facts giving rise to the privilege for groups or classes of documents,
rather than requiring in camera inspection of each contested docu-
ment.1"9 In fact, the court has already sanctioned such a procedure by
allowing claimants to demonstrate circumstantially to the Commission
that documents are privileged. Since the court's procedural rules re-
quire parties to annex to their pleadings a file containing all supporting
documents," 0 however, parties will probably be inclined to submit the
contested documents until the court announces a different rule.
Furthermore, by requiring in camera inspection of all documents
for which protection is claimed, the court would appear to presume
that the evidence already shown to the Commission was insufficient in
itself to establish a valid claim under the Community legal privilege. If
the Court of Justice truly seeks to protect privacy in the attorney-client
relationship, then it should consider the extent to which in camera in-
spection defeats that purpose by exposing confidential documents to
the judges hearing the case."'
D. Rules of Decision
It has been stated that the Court of Justice employed a "common
denominator" analysis in arriving at the rule inA.M. & . 13 By this it
is meant that the Community law of attorney-client privilege was held
by the court to include only those rules of attorney-client privilege held
108. Statute of the Court, supra note 59, art. 18; Rules of Procedure, supra note 58, art.
10.
109. Blanket assertions of attorney-client privilege are not permitted in United States
federal courts. See F.T.C. v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc. v. American Gas Assoc., 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963)). But circumstantial
evidence of a privileges existence can be applied simultaneously to a class of documents to
which the evidence would apply severally. See, eg., United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
110. Rules of Procedure, supra note 58, art. 37.
Ill. See State ex rel Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 387 (Mo. 1978)
(strongly disapproving of in camera examination of assertedly privileged documents). Ac-
cord State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 220 (S.C. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981).
Contra Law Off. of Bernard D. Morley v. MacFarlane, Colo. 647 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Colo.
1982).
112. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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in common by the Member States. ' 3 Thus, the protection offered by
the Community's attorney-client privilege encompasses no more than
the shared elements of England's "legal professional privilege,"'"14
France's "le secret professionnel,"' 15 Italy's "il segreloprofessionale ,"" 16
and so on, for all of the Member States.
The Court of Justice buttressed its decision to adopt a consensus
rather than synthesis rule by declaring that: "Community law, which
derives from not only the economic but also the legal interpenetration
of the Member States, must take into account the principles and con-
cepts common to the laws of those states concerning the observance of
confidentiality.""' 7 A vast body of authority cited by the Advocate
General, however, suggests that the court is not limited to the Member
States' consensus rule in interpreting Community law.1 8 Rather, the
court may always examine national law on a comparative basis to dis-
cover a distinct, unwritten principle of Community law.1 9 The court,
ignoring its prerogative to operate independently of national laws,
found a regrettable rule of decision in the common denominator ap-
proach which can be criticized on several grounds.
First, the Court of Justice, by focusing upon commonalities in the
Member States' rules of privilege, adopted a composite rule which does
not accurately reflect the underlying policies of the Member States'
rules. Most notably, the court denied the privilege to communications
with in-house counsel because that is the black letter rule in some
Member States.' 20 The court was aware, however, that the rule exclud-
ing in-house counsel from the privilege originated from the fact that in-
house counsel are not subject to professional ethics in some states. 12'
The court should have excluded only attorneys who were not subject to
professional ethics. Such a rule would have been consistent with the
common policy of the Member States to deny professional privilege to
lawyers who are not subject to professional discipline, while giving the
broadest effect to the reasons for recognizing an attorney-client privi-
lege in Community law by extending the privilege to communications
with otherwise eligible in-house counsel.
113. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 323.
114. See Waugh v. British Ry. Bd., [1980] A.C. 521, [1979] 2 All E.R. 1169.
115. Code Pbnal, art. 378 (Fr.).
116. Codice Penale, art. 381 (Italy).
117. A.M. & S., 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1610, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 322-23.
118. Id. at 1649-50, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 303-05 (Opinion of Advocate General).
119. Id.
120. See supra text accompanying note 30.
121. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
(Vol. 7
Attorney-Client Privilege
Second, the common denominator analysis resulted in a weak rule
that bears little relationship to the Community policies sought to be
fostered by the court. The A.M. & S. rule deprives large classes of
clients of a privilege which was, by the court's own admission, an es-
sential corollary to the defendants' rights sought to be protected against
Commission search and seizure powers.' - Clients consulting in-house
and non-Community counsel have no assurance that written legal ad-
vice will be outside of the Commission's reach, though these clients
have no less an interest in a full and fair defense than do other clients.
The court can be faulted for relying on a mechanical analysis to justify
a painfully narrow rule in an area which demands a complete analysis
of the relevant national and Community policies involved.
Third, the common denominator approach makes concessions to
national separatism by relying upon national law to formulate a Com-
munity rule. The court itself stated that the circumstances ofA.M. & S.
were ripe for a rule recognizing the need for a Community solution to a
supranational problem. 2 The court's failure to advance such a solu-
tion was an opportunity lost for the court to advance Community
integration.
It remains to be seen whether the A.M. & S. decision indicates a
policy of the Court of Justice to apply a common denominator ap-
proach on other issues. In applying the A.M. & S. standard to future
privilege cases, however, the court will presumably look to the common
rules of the Member States for guidance unless the Council promul-
gates legislation specifically addressing the issue of attorney-client priv-
ilege in Community law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Attorneys who are subject to Community jurisdiction should be
aware of A.M. & S.'s effect upon the rights of their clients acting in
Europe. To the extent that the Court of Justice rejected the Commis-
sion's claim that no attorney-client privilege exists at all in Community
law, A.M. & . is a welcome development. It is now settled that in
principle Community law protects the confidentiality of communica-
tions between counsel and corporate clients. The scope of the Commu-
nity privilege, however, is limited to communications made for
purposes of the client's defense. Furthermore, in-house counsel are not
covered, and all non-Community lawyers may be outside of the doc-
122. Regulation 17, supra note 23, arts. 11 & 14.
123. See supra text accompanying note 55.
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trine. Additionally, it is unclear what conduct may constitute a waiver
of the privilege. It is also uncertain whether the Court of Justice will
always require inspection of the contested documents in camera by the
judges in determining the applicability of the legal privilege. Finally,
while A.M. & S. strongly suggests that the rules of decision applied by
the court in attorney-client privilege cases will be limited by the "com-
mon denominator" of the Member States' rules, it remains to be seen
whether this will be workable in practice, or whether a distinct "Com-
munity common law" will emerge to fill the interstices of the general
rule laid down in A.M & S.
Perhaps the most significant unanswered question is whether the
Council will promulgate specific legislation on the subject, thus allay-
ing some doubt as to the state of the privilege in the Community.
Moreover, the time may be ripe for the United States, the Community
and the Member States, inter se, to consider signing conventions for the
mutual or reciprocal recognition of professional privileges.
